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 This paper explores how the “signal” approach can be used to examine determinants 
of currency disturbances in transition economies during 1990s. We construct the measure of 
currency disturbance – index of foreign exchange market pressure as a referent series. The 
“signals” approach is used in constructing an effective system of early warning indicators for 
each country. The system monitors the behavior of various macroeconomic and financial 
variables that exhibit an unusual pattern in the periods preceding a disturbance or crisis. By 
comparing the resulting systems of early warning indicators we are searching for the common 
determinants of currency disturbances in transition countries in the sample.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Revival of the interest in the literature on financial crises came during the 1990s where costly 
financial crises struck both developed and developing countries. Chronologically, there were 
the ERM crisis, Mexican “tequila” crisis, Asian crisis, Russian crisis, Brazilian crisis, Turkish 
crisis, and Argentinean crisis, to name the most prominent. The overall financial flows in the 
international financial markets have accelerated enormously throughout the 1990-ies, due to 
greater globalization, liberalization, interconnectedness of those financial markets, and quick 
development of information and telecommunications technologies. A rapid globalization 
process has put increasing limitations on national economic policies, especially in transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
The financial crashes have awakened interest in academic and political circles in creating 
systems for discovering the causes of the disturbances that may end in financial crises.  If 
disturbances on foreign exchange market as well as in banking sector could be identified early 
enough, there might be enough time for policy makers to take measures to avoid or at least to 
diminish the severity of such crises. 
  
Therefore, the number of theoretical and empirical works on the potential links between 
banking and currency crises is growing continuously. Many of the countries that have faced 
currency crisis have to a greater or lesser extent also faced banking crisis (recent examples 
include Finland, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Argentina and many transition economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe-CEEC).  
 
A thorough examination of the literature on twin crises would be an extremely demanding 
theoretical and empirical task. Therefore, in this paper we will limit ourselves to see which of 
the signaling indicators for currency disturbances suggested in the literature would have the 
greatest value in transition economies of CEEC. The goal of this paper is to explore how the 
“signals” method can be used to examine determinants of currency disturbances in a sample 
of transition economies during the 1990-ies. In order to identify currency disturbances, we 
construct the index of foreign exchange market pressure individually for each country. In 
constructing an effective system of early warning indicators for currency disturbances we use 
the “signals” approach developed by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997). The system 
monitors the behavior of various macroeconomic and financial variables that exhibit an 
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unusual pattern in the periods preceding a disturbance or crisis. By comparing the resulting 
systems of early warning indicators we are searching for the common determinants of 
currency disturbances in transition countries in the sample. It is especially promising that the 
signal approach has recently been successfully supplied to a sample of transition countries for 
which it was possible to gather data of adequate quality to allow testing the model. 
 
We begin this article with a short overview of theoretical and empirical analyses of currency 
crisis to summarize the causes and explanations of currency crashes according to various 
models. The third part of our work will focus on describing the “signals” approach in 
designing the early warning indicators for currency disturbances in transition economies. The 
possibility that earlier deterioration in key economic conditions provides a signal of upcoming 
crisis is our main concern. In the following section we are searching for the common 
determinants of currency disturbances in transition countries in the sample. All of this will 
provide an introduction to the final section, which examines the reliability of using the 
“signals” approach in the case of observed countries.  
 
 
2. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
 
A number of studies theoretically and empirically, found various causes of currency crises 




The first generation models tried to explain currency and debt crisis episodes of the Latin-
American developing countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The basic premise in those 
traditional models is the inconsistency with which the fundamental macroeconomic variables 
(loose monetary policy, monetization of fiscal deficit) expanded under the fixed exchange rate 
regime. The roots of these models can be found in Salant and Henderson (1978), who tried to 
model speculative attacks on the gold market. Krugman (1979) extends the Salant-Henderson 
model of speculative attack onto the fixed exchange rates. In his seminal paper, Krugman 
suggests that, under a fixed exchange rate, currency crises are preceded by periods of gradual 
decreases in international reserves and credit expansion that exceeds the demand for money or 
fiscal imbalances along with increases lending to the public sector. As a consequence, weak 
                                                 
1
 For a review of the literature see Blejer (1998), Flood and Marion (1998), and Jeanne (2000). 
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fundamentals stimulate speculative attacks on the domestic currency, which further exhausts 
reserves and forces the monetary authorities to devalue or to abandon the fixed exchange rate 
regime. Although Krugman’s model was later revised and re-appraised, it represents the basis 
of the first generation models
2
 which usually emphasize the following potential indicators of 
currency crises: movements in the real exchange rate, trade balance or current account 
balance, monetary expansion, monetization of fiscal deficit.   
 
Foreign exchange market developments and expectations are put forward in the second 
generation models (speculative models)
3
. The basic premise of those models is that currency 
crises can occur even when macroeconomic fundamentals are consistent, driven by self-
fulfilling speculative attacks (Obstfeld 1984, 1986, 1994, 1996). A crisis occurs when 
expectations of the foreign exchange market participants are coherently turned in one 
direction. That cohering factor - the trigger - can be anything from a political event, release of 
some data to a change of economic policy.
4
 The very mechanism of coherence diffusion is 
also modeled as "rational" herd behavior of the foreign exchange market participants and 




The development of the third generation models of currency and financial crises intensified 
after the Asian crisis (1997/98). These models combine currency crises with the financial 
sector disturbances and weaknesses, emphasizing the effects of financial sector liberalization, 
weak supervision and regulation, as well as bad risk management and moral hazard of the 
financial institutions. The initial attempt to connect financial sector weaknesses and the 
currency crises can be found in Diaz-Alejandro (1985). Most of the third generation models
6
 
emphasize the moral hazard problem and over-lending by the financial institutions with 
                                                 
2
 Flood and Garber (1984) construct a linear simplification of Krugman’s model within a stochastic framework, 
and Blanco and Garber (1986) extend it to a structural model for analyzing and predicting the exact timing of a 
devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1973-1982. The model showed that credit growth and main monetary 
aggregates are significant variables in determining the probability of the crisis. Goldberg (1993), and Cumby and 
Wijnbergen (1989) who showed that credit growth was a main cause of the speculative attacks in Argentina in 
early 1980s extended that model. Dornbusch (1987) re-appraises the differences between Krugman’s 
deterministic and Flood-Garber stochastic model in the case of Argentina.  
3
 Ozkan and Sutherland (1995); Obstfeld (1984, 1986, 1994, 1996); Gerlach and Smets (1994). 
4
 Some of the models do explore the self-fulfilling speculative attacks as a multiple equilibria phenomenon, 
which does not necessary have to end in a currency crisis - that outcome only arises when the economic agents 
stop believing in the government policies (Obstfeld, 1994). 
5
 Allen and Gale (2000); Baig and Goldfajn (1998); Caramazza, Ricci, and Salgado (2000); Eichengreen, Rose 
and Wyplozs (1996); Gerlach and Smets (1994); Kruger, Osakwe, and Page (1998); Masson (1998). 
6
 Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998b); Demirguc-Knut and Detragiache (1998); Dooley (2000); Eichengreen 
and Rose (1998); Glick and Hutchison (2000); Gruben and McComb (1997); Irwin and Vines (1999); Kaminsky 
(1998); Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Krugman (1998, 1999); McKinnon and Phill (1995). 
 5 
implicit or explicit government guarantees, the creation of a speculative bubble and burst of 
the bubble when unfavorable fundamental developments cause the value of loans to exceed 
the guaranteed amount. One of the key factors related to financial and currency crises is the 
fact that financial institutions draw funds from abroad in order to start the over-lending 
process. These models led to a development of the twin crisis concept.
7
 Studies examining 
possible links between banking and currency crises, i.e. twin crisis, are still very rare, even 
though greater interest has been shown in making them the subject of serious researches. In 
short, twin crisis concept suggests that twin crises have common roots in the deregulation of 
the financial system, in credit expansion and deterioration of the balance-of-payments. During 
the 1970’s, when financial markets were highly regulated, there was no evidence of strong 
connections between currency and banking crises. The weakening of capital regulations in the 
1980’s and 1990’s in developing but also in developed countries strengthened this connection. 
All studies examining the concept of twin crises suggest that financial liberalization often 
precede banking disturbances that often reach their peak during the currency crisis (if it 
occurs at all). 
 
Based on above mentioned theoretical literature, various studies tried to explain the crises by 
using different empirical models in order to identify significant variables or even leading 
indicators. Within the existing empirical literature, we can separate two key approaches: the 
traditional approach and the most recent signaling (nonparametric) approach. The first 
approach generally tries to use econometric modeling to find the causes of crises
8
. Those 
studies that provide qualitative description of pre-crisis events
9
 can also be considered 
traditional. The same is the case with various parametric and nonparametric tests of the 
influence of particular variables on exchange rate stability and various estimates of the 
probability 
10
of currency crisis based on explicit theoretical models. Although the majority of 
                                                 
7
 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) did pioneering empirical work on the twin crises. An earlier version of that 
research was published in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). Theoretical models of the connection of the currency 
and banking crises can be found in: Diaz-Alejandro (1985); Velasco (1987); Calvo (1995); Goldfajn and Valdes 
(1995); Miller (1998); and Chang and Velasco (1998). 
8
 Regression and more classical econometric modeling can be found in: Frankel and Rose (1996), Eichengreen, 
Rose and Wyplosz (1996), Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), Cumby and Wijnbergen (1989), Ötker and 
Pazarbasioglu (1994, 1995), Edin and Vredin (1993), Edwards (1989), Klein and Marion (1994), Kruger, 
Osakwe and Page (1998), Razin and Milesi-Ferritti (1997), Caramazza, Ricci and Salgado (2000), Corsetti, 
Pesenti and Roubini (1998a), and Eichengreen and Rose (1998). 
9
 See Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Valdes (1995), Kamin (1988), Edwards (1989), Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz 
(1995), Frankel and Rose (1996), Eichengreen and Rose (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) Caramazza, 
Ricci and Salgado (2000), Aziz, Caramazza and Salgado (2000).  
10
 Probit/logit models were developed under the methodological influence of Blanco and Garber (1986), who 
used these methods in analyzing the Mexican crisis of the early 1980s. 
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works are focused on the causes of currency crisis, more recent works include studies of 




The traditional methodology for estimating the probability of crisis is quite uniform. That is, 
studies using this method most often define crises via an index of pressure on the foreign 
exchange market
12
, which is influenced by changes in international reserves, exchange rate 
and interest rate. The currency crisis indicator is modeled as a zero-one variable and the 
significance of all explanatory variables that enter the model in a linear fashion is analyzed 
simultaneously. The probability of crisis is estimated via probit or logit models with 
maximum likelihood estimation. Because of the assumption that worsening economic 
conditions gradually culminate in a crisis, the models use lagged variables. 
 
The traditional approach (estimation of likelihood) has an advantage in its simple 
interpretation. All information about a future crisis is contained in a single number. However, 
it seems that this advantage also represents a disadvantage of the method. This approach does 
not allow the researcher to rate indicators according to their relative predictive power. Either 
the variables are significant or they are not, and if they occasionally send incorrect signals, the 
methodology cannot detect this. This methodology can hardly be expected tell us what “went 
wrong” in the global economic activity or how to reformulate the economic policy to avoid a 
crisis. 
 
The “signals” approach as a non-parametric method attempts to overcome the limitations 
faced by the traditional method in building a specific early warning system for crises. The 
starting point is that disturbances that may lead to a crisis do not happen accidentally, but are 
rather a result of the gradual deterioration in economic conditions. This approach begins with 
a detailed analysis of the behavior of variables whose movements in the pre-crisis period 
differ substantially from their usual behavior in normal economic conditions. Kaminsky, 
Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) established the “signals” approach as an alternative method to 
facilitate deeper understanding of the behavior of macroeconomic forces that pushed the 
country into the crisis. Since variables that issue warning signals can be identified easily, this 
method may be useful for designing adequate policy interventions. The idea of developing a 
                                                 
11
 For example Hardy and Pazabasioglu (1998), Demirguc-Knut and Detragiache (1998).  
12
 Using this method, Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995, 1996) identify 77 currency crises in the years 1959 
to 1973.  
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system of economic indicators that can anticipate crises derives from the literature on business 
cycles and the methods used to forecast business cycle turning points.
13
 A major disadvantage 
of the method is the lack of analysis of the relationship between the currency crisis indicator 
(index of foreign exchange market pressure) and possible signaling indicators in a 
multivariate way, so the interaction among indicators is not considered. This weakness can be 
overcome by constructing a composite early warning indicator, which is usually calculated as 
a weighted sum of the individual indicators. 
 
The implementation of the “signals” approach started only in the late 1990s, and could be 
very useful for multilateral financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank (for 
monitoring purposes), as well as for the investment community. In the future, one can expect 





Our motives for using the “signals” approach to estimate the vulnerability of the foreign 
exchange markets in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) sample are as follows:  
 The “signals” approach is a new analytical and forecasting method, and its improvement 
and increasing usage is expected; 
 The “signals” method is applicable even in the situations where there are data problems, 
such as short series of reliable data, structural changes in the economy, frequent changes 
in the data methodology, a small number of crisis episodes, that are also evident in the 
case of the transition economies. 
 The last but not less important reason is the lack of the regionally focused studies in the 
literature on currency crisis. It is clear that using a broadly defined sample of countries 
(consists of both emerging and developed economies) can help to obtain strong and 
reliable results that support theoretical assumptions. However, in order to obtain more 
reliable early warning indicators, specific conditions and differences of the regions must 
be considered. Since studies focused on CEEC area are still very rare mainly due to 
                                                 
13
 This refers to a well-known leading economic indicators approach (barometric method) which is used to 
monitor and forecast economic activity. 
14
 Thus, it is not strange that several studies examining the possibilities of using this method to analyze currency 
or banking crises have already appeared. See, for example, Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997), Kaminsky 
(1998), Bruggemann and Linne (1999), Edison (2000), Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Nierhaus 
(2000), Glick and Hutchison (2000),. 
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statistical data problems, we are trying to contribute to better understanding of these 




A more detailed description of how the “signals” approach functions is given in the following 
section, which shows an empirical test of the effectiveness of the method in predicting 
currency disturbances in the CEEC sample. The ultimate goal of the research is to identify the 
best signaling indicators for each country that can serve as a base for discovering common 
determinants of the currency disturbances of the sample. 
 
 
3. DESIGNING THE EARLY WARNING INDICATORS FOR CURRENCY 
DISTRUBANCES  IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
 
3.1. Data and scope of the sample 
 
This section describes the “signals” method and some of the empirical results obtained by 
using this method on the sample. The sample consists of Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 
We examine 20 currency disturbances or crises from the sample identified by the index of 
foreign exchange market pressure. The research uses monthly data from ten transition 
countries from the beginning of 1990 up to the end of 2002 and a few quarterly data series. 
Data sources include the IMF International Financial Statistics, The Vienna Institute for 
International Economic Studies Database and National Central Bank’s websites.  
 
3.2. Defining crises and choices of potential indicators  
 
In order to make the signal approach operational, a number of terms must be defined. Given 
the fact that, the sample in our research comprises of both countries that have experienced less 
and more severe currency disturbances we use a broader definition of a crisis. Currency crises 
(disturbances) are defined as situations in which speculative attacks on the currency lead to a 
substantial depreciation, a substantial decrease in international reserves or a combination of 
one and the other. This analytical approach rests on a broad definition that includes both 
                                                 
15
 Examples include Bruggemann and Linne (1999) Ahec-Šonje (2001), Schardax (2002). 
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successful and unsuccessful attacks on various exchange rate regimes. Successful attacks 
usually end in devaluation scenarios, while episodes of unsuccessful attacks may shake the 
foreign exchange market without resulting in devaluation. We will focus our research on 
crises identified by the behavior of an index of foreign exchange market pressure (FEMPI).
16
 
Because of the index’s relative novelty, there is no consensus about a standard way of its 
calculation. It is usually calculated as a simple mean but more and more often as a weighted 
average, with standard deviations of the exchange rate and international reserves (because of 
different volatility of the exchange rate and international reserves) as weights
17
. In a period of 
higher sensitivity and volatility in the foreign exchange market, the index usually exceeds two 




The exchange market pressure index is constructed by using the rates of change in the 





FEMPI*t = Δ et - stdE/stdR*Δ Rt 
 
where Δ et is the real bilateral NC
20/EUR exchange rate, Δ Rt gross international reserves (in 
USD), and stdE/stdR the ratio of standard deviations of the real exchange rate and 
international reserves. The index is constructed in such a way that a depreciation of national 
currency and decreased international reserves work in the same direction, making the index 
grow and expressing stronger downward pressure on the currency if it exceeds +2 standard 
deviations
21
. The following table shows the dates of currency crises detected by the FEMPI.  
Table 1. Currency crises and disturbances in CEEC 
                                                 
16
 The index itself originates in the 1970s monetary approach to the balance of payments and exchange rate. By 
the end of 1970s, Girton and Roper (1977) formulated a monetary approach equation aimed at working 
regardless of the exchange rate regime. The idea of measuring the foreign exchange market pressure has been 
revived by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) and later by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997). 
17
 Some authors incorporate interest rates in the formula alongside foreign exchange and reserves. However, we 
do not include them in the calculation because the interest rates in the observed economies have continuously 
been decreasing during the periods of financial market deregulation and structural economic changes.  
18
 Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) pronounce periods with FEMPI exceeding +/- 3 standard deviations 
as “turbulent”, Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplozs (1995) look for +/- 2 standard deviations violation, while 
Nierhaus (2000) uses +/- 1,25 standard deviations to identify currency crises in Turkey. 
19
 Real bilateral exchange rate equals eNC/EUR,t = ENC/EUR,t * pEUR,t / pt, where pEUR,t and pt are HICP inflation in 
the eurozone, and CPI inflation in the national economies, respectively. 
20
 National currency. 
21
 For analytical purposes, we use +/-1,5 standard deviation in cases of Romania and Slovenia, and in Lithuania 
+/-1,25 standard deviation violation to pick up mild pressures on foreign exchange markets  
 
 10 
  Number of Beginning Percentage Percentage of 
  disturbances/ of the disturbance  fall in depreciation  of 
  crises  or crisis reserves foreign exchange  
       (monthly) rate 
Bulgaria* 3 Jul-94 49.2  1.5 
   May-96 4.4  29.7 
    Dec-96  1.3  24.6 
The Czech Republic 2 May-97  13.0  4.4 
    Feb-99  2.7  6.1 
Croatia 2 Jan/Feb-99  14.9 3.3  
    Jan-01  1.8 5.9 
Hungary 2 Mar-95  0.9  4.6 
    Sep-98  6.5  3.7 
Latvia 2 Sep-98  9.3  2.0 
    Dec-00/Jan-01  5.6  7.0 
Lithuania 2 Sep-98  9.2  1.2 
    Dec-99  16.6  +0.3 
Poland 2 Sep-98  5.2  4.8 
    Aug-01  +2.1  6.6 
Romania 2 Nov-91  11.5  106.3 
    Jan-97  15.2  14.0 
The Slovak Republic 1 Sep/Oct-98  17.8  4.8 
Slovenia 2 Aug-95 6.6  1.8 
    Jun-98  9.8  4.0 
*Second and third disturbances are overlapping 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
For example, according to accessible data, FEMPI for the Czech Republic reveals two 
currency disturbances in the observed period (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. 
Source: calculations of the authors 
 
We will try to build a system of signal indicators for the group of countries based on 
identified turbulent episodes. The choice of indicators whose behavior in the pre-crisis period 
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is to be tested is based on theory and on the availability of monthly data. The list of potential 
indicators of crises is based on the Kaminsky-Lizondo-Reinhart list of 105 indicators, used by 
most studies on the signal approach as a starting point
22. Based on the “early warning 
indicators” literature, the most important indicators that have been found to provide signals 
about upcoming currency crises are: international reserves, the real exchange rate, credit 
growth, inflation, fiscal deficit, real GDP growth, credit to the public sector, M4/international 
reserves. The following table shows the total of 37 potential economic and financial indicators 
of currency disturbances
23
, with their expected signs in a pre-crisis period (a description of 
data is shown in Appendix 1). 
 
Table 2. Indicators of currency disturbances in CEEC 
INDICATORS expected sign  
The real effective exchange rate;  
The real bilateral NC/EUR exchange rate;  
International reserves, total;  
Net usable international reserves (NUIR), nc;  
NUIR/broad money (M4);  
Central bank’s (CB) foreign assets/M4;  
Bank deposits 1 and 2;  
Banks’ reserves with CB/total bank assets;  
Exports;  
Trade balance;  






M1 multiplier;   
Money supply (M1), real;  
Reserve money (M0),  nominal and real;  
Domestic credit/output;  
Domestic credit, nominal;   
Bank claims to the public sector/total assets;  
Monetary institutions’ claims to public sector (net);  
CB’s claims on banks;  
Foreign liabilities of monetary institutions;  
Imports;  
Budget deficit/output;  
Real money market interest rate;  







A brief summary of the stylized facts about their behavior before and during the crisis is given 
in the Box 1. 
                                                 
22
 The Kaminsky-Lizondo-Reinhart list was compiled by Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1997) after 
reviewing the existing empirical literature. The authors found that as many as 43 indicators from the list were 
found significant in at least one of the reviewed 28 studies. Hawkins and Klau (2000) reviewed 30 more studies 
published since 1997, and conclude that most of the recent empirical studies base their research on the KLR list 
of indicators. 
23
 Actually, we use 28 economic and financial indicators, but having interpolated budget deficit/output and 
domestic credits/output, our list has expanded to 37 indicators.  
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Box 1.  
 In pre-crisis periods, the domestic currency is either heavily overvalued or else exposed to a strong pressure 
to appreciate. Therefore, real effective and real bilateral NC/EUR exchange rates usually bear negative 
signs.  
 We can also expect to see a reduction of international reserves (gross and net) due to moves to defend the 
proclaimed exchange rate parity. The ratio of net usable reserves to M4 and the ratio of foreign assets of 
the CB to M4 (reserves adequacy ratio) are considered good indicators of currency crises. Depositors, 
especially in developing and emerging markets, will take shelter in the currency they consider a safe haven 
for keeping their financial wealth as the government economic policies lose their credibility.  
 In the case of M4 and M1 multipliers, we may expect a positive sign. An increase in the multiplier with an 
unchanged monetary base signals an expansionary monetary policy and likely pressure, leading to a 
deterioration of the domestic currency. 
 The growth of money supply and reserve money also means that the monetary policy is expansionary, 
causing pressure for the domestic currency to deteriorate, so we expect a positive sign. 
 Credit expansion is considered a strong signal of currency and banking disturbances to come. It usually 
accompanies the phases of the “business cycle”24 and domestic financial liberalization. So the ratio of 
credits to output and growth of bank credits to domestic sectors are related positively to currency (and 
banking) disturbances. 
 Out of the models of the twin crisis, we included the following indicators of banking sector vulnerability25, 
which can also provoke currency disturbances: total bank deposits (expected to fall before/during the 
banking crisis, due to a run on banks), the ratio of bank reserves to total bank assets (expected to fall 
because of the increase of bank assets – i.e. the credit boom), the ratio of bank claims on public sector to 
total assets, and the monetary institutions’ claims on the central government (expected to grow in the 
pre-crisis period due to a monetization of the public deficit), CB claims on banks (these grow as their 
liquidity shrinks), and foreign liabilities of the monetary institutions (increasing their external 
vulnerability). 
 Exports have negative expected signs in pre-crisis episodes (weak output and exports either weaken the 
exchange rate, or an overvalued exchange rate slows down exports and output).  
 We except to see an import increase in the pre-crisis period (helped by an overvalued currency), which also 
worsens the balance of trade and current account balance (expected negative signs).  
 A widening of the budget deficit/output usually causes monetary expansion, hence the currency crisis (as 
established in the first generation models).  
 Interest rates are usually very weak indicators of the currency crises, while being better indicators of the 
banking crises. An increase of nominal (and real) interest rates could mean shrinking liquidity in the 
financial system, while high difference between real lending and deposit rate can signal a risk increase and 
deterioration of the bank portfolio, as well as lack of competition and supervisory and regulatory 
weaknesses. 
 Reduced capital inflows can be a sign of international financial markets disturbances, as well as of distrust 
in the local government’s economic policy. This indicator can signal so-called “spill-over effects” within 
regions, as in 1998, when a currency crisis in one Asian country affected another, drying out capital inflows 
in the whole region.  
 Increased capital outflows can trigger a currency crisis and may deepen banking problems if it is closely 




                                                 
24
 Kindleberger (1996) warned long ago that financial crisis could be associated with certain phases in the 
business cycle.  
25
 We include them because banking disturbances have occurred almost simultaneously as currency disturbances 
during 1997/98/99 in some of observed CEEC 
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3.2.1. The signal horizon, signals and critical values (thresholds) 
 
The signal horizon is the period before a crisis during which the behavior of the indicators 
signals the upcoming crisis. We chose a horizon of 12 months before each disturbance. 
A signal emitted within 12 months prior to the outbreak of currency disturbances constitutes a 
good signal. A signal emitted before that date is correspondingly a bad or false signal. An 
indicator provides a warning signal within a 12-month window if it exceeds a critical value 
(threshold). The critical values are set to achieve a certain balance between the risk of having 
false signals (noise) and the risk of ignoring good signals of a crisis that is in fact impending. 
However, there are no general rules for determining the critical value. If the threshold is set 
very high, the indicator is likely to ignore all but the most severe crises. If the critical value is 
set very low, there is a risk of catching a number of false warning signals in tranquil times. 
We set the critical values k* in relation to percentiles of the distribution of observations of the 
indicator It, in order to discriminate between “normal” and “abnormal” behavior of an 
individual indicator. In most cases we use 25% percentile of the distribution (if the indicator 
falls prior to currency disturbances) or 75% percentile of the distribution (if the indicator rises 
prior to crisis). After determining the thresholds, we determine the total number of good and 
false signals in crisis and tranquil times:  
 
a) for indicators with positive expected signs in pre-crisis period it holds: 
St = 1, if It  k,  St = 0, if It  k  
 
b) for indicators with negative expected signs in pre-crisis period it holds: 
St = 1, if It  k, St = 0, if It  k     
 
St is a binary signal variable, constructed by virtue of the principle set above. An indicator 
sends a good signal if St = 1 and a crisis occurs within the signal horizon, or St = 0 and no 
crisis occurs within a tranquil period. On the contrary, an indicator issues a false signal if St = 
1 and no crisis breaks out within a tranquil period, or St = 0 and a crisis breaks out within the 




, which was defined as the one that minimized the ratio of bad to good 
signals. 
 
3.2.2. Performance of Individual Indicators for Countries in the Sample 
 
The most important criterion for assessing the effectiveness of indicators is the confirmation 
of their reliability in signaling a future crisis. The performance of each indicator can be 
estimated in terms of the following matrix (Table 3): 
 







signal was sent (St = 1) A B A+B 
no signal was sent (St = 0)      C D C+D 
total A+C B+D A+B+C+D 
good signals A D A+D 
good as % of total A/(A+C) D/(B+D) (A+D)/(A+B+C+D) 
false as  % of total C/(A+C) B/(B+D) (B+C)/(A+B+C+D) 
Source: Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997), Nierhaus (2000). 
 
In the above matrix, A is the number of months in which the indicator issued good signals of 
an upcoming crisis, B is the number of months with bad signals (noise), C is the number of 
months without a signal but that were followed by a crisis, and D is the number of months 
without a signal and no subsequent crisis.  
 
An ideal indicator is one that produces a signal in every month within the signal horizon, so 
that A>0 and C=0, or one which does not produce any signals in time horizon that is not to be 
followed by a crisis, so that D>0 and B=0. Based on this matrix and following the method of 
KLR
27
, it is possible to calculate measures that can help rank the indicators according to their 
predictive power. As an example, we present the information on the performance of 
individual indicators of currency disturbances for the Czech Republic.  
 
                                                 
26
 The threshold has been lowered to the 33,3%-th or the 66,67%-th percentile in individual cases, to obtain the 
minimal value of adjusted NTS ratio.  
27




Table 4. Performance of Individual Indicators for currency disturbances: The Czech Republic  
  
INDICATORS 
noise-to- % good  % false  P crisis/ P crisis/signal 
signal ratio signals signals signal  – P crisis 
B/(B+D)/       A/(A+B) – 
A/(A+C) A/(A+C) B/(B+D) A/(A+B) ((A+C)/(A+B+C+D)) 
1 2 3 5 6 
1 Real money market interest rate 0.26 58 15 54 31 
2 NUIR / M4,yoy 0.32 67 22 53 26 
3 CB claims on DMB's 0.33 50 17 50 25 
4 Net usable reserves (NUIR),nc 0.44 42 18 45 18 
5 Exports, USD 0.48 42 20 42 16 
6 Real effective exchange rate 0.52 42 22 28 11 
7 Reserve money, M0, nominal 0.55 50 28 40 13 
8 International reserves, USD 0.56 38 21 39 13 
9 Foreign liabilities of monetary institutions 0.56 50 28 38 13 
10 DMBs' deposits 1 0.56 50 28 38 13 
11 DMBs' deposits 2 0.56 38 21 38 13 
12 Foreign assets /M4, yoy 0.64 46 29 37 10 
13 Reserve money, M0, real 0.64 46 29 37 10 
14 Claims on gen.government, net, monet. instit. 0.67 46 31 33 8 
15 Domestic credits / output  0.70 33 23 33 7 
16 NUIR/M4 0.72 42 30 33 7 
17 Foreign assets /M4 0.72 42 30 33 7 
18 Domestic credits/output (ind,ma) 0.80 29 23 30 4 
19 Domestic credits / output (CPI) 0.84 29 25 29 3 
20 Capital outflows 0.87 25 22 29 3 
21 Budget deficit/output (CPI) 0.96 21 20 24 1 
22 Real bilateral exchange rate, nc/euro 0.98 25 24 22 0 
23 Trade balance 0.99 33 33 26 0 
24 Budget deficit/output 1.01 33 34 23 0 
25 Capital inflows 1.04 25 26 25 -1 
26 Current account balance 1.04 25 26 25 -1 
27 Budget deficit/output (ind) 1.20 21 25 20 -3 
28 Real lending-real deposit rate 1.20 29 35 20 -3 
29 Budget deficit/output (ind,ma) 1.25 25 31 19 -4 
30 DMBs' reserves/total assets 1.27 21 26 21 -4 
31 Domestic credits/ output (ind) 1.45 25 36 19 -7 
32 M4/M0 2.33 17 39 13 -12 
33 M1/M0 3.67 8 31 8 -17 
34 Domestic credit, nominal 5.00 8 42 6 -19 
35 Imports, USD 5.14 8 43 6 -20 
36 DMBs' claims on public sector/total assets 10.33 4 43 3 -22 
37 Money supply, M1, real ∞+ 0 35 0 -29 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
The key measure calculated on the basis of the matrix is the adjusted noise-to-signal ratio 
(the first column of Table 4). The ratio provides information on the ability of the indicator to 
produce correct signals and to avoid false signals. Analytically, the adjusted noise-to-signal 
ratio is the ratio of false signals’ share in tranquil times to good signals’ share in crisis period 
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(in terms of above metrics, (B/B+D)/(A/A+C)). The lower this ratio comes in for an indicator 
(close to zero), the more successful is the indicator in predicting currency disturbances. If an 
indicator issues signals at random times, the expected value of the ratio is equal to unity. 
Therefore, all those variables with noise-to-signal ratio equal to or higher than unity should 
not be considered credible.  
 
The second column shows the number of good signals as a percentage of the number of 
months in which good signals could have been emitted. The maximum score (100%) would 
belong to an indicator that sent signals every month within the signal horizon before every 
observed crisis. The third column shows the ratio of false signals to the number of months 
during tranquil times. The last measure of “noisiness” of the indicators is the difference 
between the probability of a crisis conditional on a signal from the indicator and the 
unconditional probability of a crisis (the fifth and the sixth column of Table 4). For those 
indicators that have “predictive power” (whose adjusted noise-to-signal ratio is lower than 
unity), the conditional probability (in terms of above metrics A/(A+B)) would be higher than 
the unconditional one ((A+C)/(A+B+C+D)). 
 
The results of the “signals” approach used in this in-sample analysis can serve as a basis for 
designing an early warning system for currency disturbances. The early warning system for 
each country should consist of the indicators with the adjusted noise-to-signal ratio lower than 





According to the results of the “signals” method given in the Appendix 2, we provide a short 
overview of currency disturbances scenarios in the observed CEEC. 
 
FEMPI detected three currency disturbances in Bulgaria, two of which have overlapping 
signal horizons (in 1996).  These points indeed coincide with turbulent periods in 1996, which 
were also accompanied by hyperinflatory economic surrounding. After a severe banking crisis 
in the course of 1996, when the number of banks was almost halved, a currency crisis begins. 
The troublesome episode with “twin” crisis elements ended in the introduction of a currency 
                                                 
28
 Combining the information provided by the set of early warning indicators can be employed in producing 
useful indices of vulnerability of the foreign exchange market. The idea is to construct the composite indicator of 
currency disturbances by weighting the signals of each individual indicator. 
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board. There are almost 30 indicators that have proved to be good signals in this case. Thus, 
Bulgaria has shown to be a solid member of the sample for testing of the method. Top ranked 
signals are reserve adequacy ratio, along with other versions of international reserve 
movements, reserve money, interest rates and budget deficit. Such a combination of signaling 
variables typical of both banking and currency crisis confirms that the impulse to the 1997 
episode came from the banking sector. We acknowledge that the fiscal sector was also 
problematic. 
 
The Czech Republic experienced two currency disturbances, with leading indicator being 
money market interest rate. Such a result sets the trigger of the disturbances in the capital 
markets, and suggests that ”twin” disturbances might have occurred. Indicators that follow 
interest rates further support this claim (NUIR/M4, central bank claims on banks, foreign 
liabilities of monetary institutions etc. IMF (1998) reports of speculative attacks on the koruna 
in 1997, after which the fixed exchange rate regime is abandoned. After the foreign exchange 
market pressure in 1999, the central bank introduces targeting inflation mechanism.  
 
FEMPI revealed two disturbances in Croatia. The first currency disturbance happened at the 
beginning of 1999 after the peak of the banking crisis (1998/99). The CNB eased the 
depreciation pressures through foreign exchange interventions. Worsened liquidity of the 
banking and real sector limited the banks’ ability to control their own liquidity, so they had no 
power to launch a coordinated speculative attack. Furthermore, the fact that the sale of 
domestic securities to foreigners was not yet liberalized and that the government financed 
itself largely in the international markets helped Croatia avoid a full-blown crisis. That is why 
it is not surprising, that all indicators connected with credits given to/by deposit banks, have 
proved to be good signals. On the contrary, the 2001 disturbance was brought about by a 
combination of the monetary relaxation and partial capital account liberalization. 
 
A country that seems to be less prone to crises and disturbances than the other members of the 
sample is Hungary.  FEMPI registered only two milder pressures, which might be due to 
overvalued currency. That is why the real effective exchange rate behaves as a good signaling 
indicator in pre-crises period, which obviously spurred imports (the best-ranked indicator). 
 
 18 
In Latvia signals that were exerted were typically symptomatic of currency disturbances 
caused by expansionary monetary policy. Although its early 1990-ies have passed relatively 
quietly, Latvia did have two currency disturbances at the end of the decade.  
 
Lithuania, like many other countries in the sample experienced currency disturbances in 
1998, and in 2001. Budget deficit/output ratio has risen in period preceding crisis, providing 
information on the cause of the outbreak – fiscal trigger with implications for monetary policy 
(monetization of the deficit). Credible signaling of domestic credits and claims on government 
was also registered. In the external sector, probably due to the Russian crisis, exports have 
moved downward, which does fit into the theoretical scenario of contagion effect. Having 
withstood the international crisis spillover in 1998, the currency board remained (IMF, 1999).  
 
Poland`s best indicators strongly suggest that the currency disturbance came along with 
problems in banking sector marked by deposits fall, the rise in real money market interest 
rates and the difference between real lending and real deposit rate.  The contagion effects and 
fiscal monetization might be partial explanations as well, as the trade balance and budget 
deficit indicators have emitted signals. 
 
Romania has had severe currency crisis on two occasions in the 1990-ies. At the beginning of 
the decade, they were perpetuated by political changes, while 1997 episode impulse belongs 
to the monetary and banking sector. The reserve adequacy ratio produces warning signals 
with 50 percent probability
29
. The lack of confidence in the domestic currency is evident. 
There is strong evidence that troubles were provoked by the monetary expansion, as is stated 
by the IMF, in order to finance the public sector imbalances.  
 
Slovakia has experienced only one disturbance in the observed period. FEMPI detected 
relatively large decrease in international reserves towards the end of 1998. Widespread 
expectations of a post-election devaluation, the Russian episode and fiscal sector weaknesses 
may have given an impetus to the disturbance. 
 
                                                 
 
29
 Kaminsky, Lizondo, Reinhart (1997) asserts that good indicators announce disturbances with probability 
ranging from 28 to 32 percent.  
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Two negligible currency disturbances in Slovenia were registered in 1995 and 1998. 
Persistent capital inflows in 1997 have posed a threat to monetary stability (IMF, 1998), and 
as variable they do issue good signals in the country. The best ranked indicators were reserve 
money, the real bilateral exchange rate and import growth. 
 
 
3.3. Searching for common signals of currency disturbances in the sample 
 
Thanks to the results obtained from each country in the sample, we are able to further 
investigate the existence of common causes of currency disturbances in the region. To 
examine this issue, we constructed “the group matrix”. It comprises all 37 indicators as well 
as information of total number of good and bad signals for the sample. This approach solves 
the dilemma of how to calculate the performance of indicators for the region. That is why, the 
“matrix” value of the adjusted noise-to-signal ratio for each indicator is lower than the one 
obtained by calculating the simple average of noise-to-signal ratios for each indicator across 
the countries. The “matrix” results indeed verify the theoretical presumptions on the behavior 
of various economic and financial indicators in pre-crisis periods.  
 
The results of how indicators perform regarding the disturbances in the region are given in the 
following table. The top ranked indicators with noise-to-signal ratio of about 0,5 are growth 
of reserve money, reserve adequacy ratio, and foreign liabilities of monetary institutions. 
These findings confirm the results of previous empirical works dealing with larger samples of 
countries. As we argued earlier, the fall of reserve adequacy ratio has proved to be a good 
signal, even in the group. Continuously present expectations of possible severe currency 
disturbances among depositors force monetary authorities to keep the level of international 
reserves high enough in order to respond to increased demand for foreign currency. The rise 
in foreign liabilities also exposes the economies to a higher risk of currency crisis. However, 
the needs to finance development usually turn the emerging markets towards the international 
financial markets, making them vulnerable to external disturbances. Since the real reserve 
money is the best-ranked indicator, we can assume that the monetary policy was relatively 
expansionary in 1990-ies causing pressure on domestic currencies. This exercise has also 
shown that large budget deficits can trigger monetary expansion, making the markets 
vulnerable to currency disturbances, as the first generation models suggest.  
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 INDICATORS Number of  Total  noise-to-signal 
ratio 
% good signals % false signals P crisis/signal P crisis/signal – P crisis 
  crisis observations  B/(B+D)/A/(A+C) A/(A+C) B/(B+D) A/(A+B) A/(A+B) –A+C/(A+B+C+D) 
  months used 1 2 3 5 6 
1 Reserve money, M0, real 181 896 0.53 46 25 32 12 
2 NUIR/M4 159 691 0.56 44 25 35 12 
3 Foreign liabilities of monetary institutions 163 756 0.58 43 25 32 10 
4 Real money market interest rate 175 741 0.61 42 26 34 10 
5 Money supply, M1, real 154 684 0.61 40 24 32 9 
6 Budget deficit/output (ind) 73 348 0.64 36 23 29 8 
7 Budget deficit/output (ind,ma) 97 456 0.67 36 24 29 8 
8 Foreign assets /M4 171 795 0.69 42 29 28 6 
9 Budget deficit/output (CPI) 121 525 0.71 31 22 30 7 
10 NUIR / M4,yoy 175 856 0.72 39 28 26 6 
11 DMBs' reserves/total assets 139 659 0.73 33 24 27 6 
12 Domestic credits / output (CPI) 140 610 0.74 36 27 29 6 
13 CB claims on DMB's 187 867 0.74 35 26 27 5 
14 Domestic credits / output  188 780 0.75 36 27 30 6 
15 Real effective exchange rate 222 1235 0.75 34 25 23 5 
16 Domestic credits/ otuput (ind) 92 410 0.77 36 28 27 5 
17 DMBs' deposits 1 132 626 0.77 39 30 26 5 
18 Capital inflows* 62 267 0.79 34 27 28 5 
19 Foreign assets /M4, yoy 163 743 0.79 34 27 26 4 
20 Real bilateral exchange rate, nc/euro 219 1053 0.8 32 25 25 4 
21 Real lending-real deposit rate 187 916 0.8 36 29 24 4 
22 Budget deficit/output 145 588 0.81 33 26 30 5 
23 Net usable reserves (NUIR),nc 163 750 0.81 33 26 25 3 
24 Claims on gen.government, net, monet. instit. 187 827 0.82 37 27 29 0 
25 International reserves, USD 187 937 0.9 32 29 22 2 
26 Reserve money, M0, nominal 211 972 0.91 31 29 23 1 
27 Domestic credit, nominal 187 834 0.92 32 30 24 2 
28 Capital outflows* 66 302 0.96 27 26 23 1 
29 Domestic credits/output (ind,ma) 116 510 0.97 28 28 23 0 
30 Current account balance* 50 207 1 28 28 24 0 
31 Imports, USD 204 981 1.03 30 31 20 -1 
32 Trade balance 204 992 1.05 31 33 20 -1 
33 DMBs' claims on public sector/total assets 211 969 1.09 27 30 20 -2 
34 M4/M0 187 858 1.18 28 33 19 -3 
35 DMBs' deposits 2 199 871 1.24 27 33 19 -4 
36 M1/M0 173 740 1.26 25 31 20 -3 
37 Exports, USD 204 952 1.28 26 33 18 -3 
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Among the indicators with credible predictive power, we can also find many strong signals of 
banking sector vulnerability, which obviously provoke the currency crises episodes in the 
region. For example, the ratio of banks’ reserves to total assets as well as central bank’s 
claims on deposit banks have emitted good signals in pre-crisis periods in many of the 
countries. Evidently, the challenge of faster growth in order to meet the criteria for joining the 
European Union makes this region vulnerable to various domestic and external factors. 
 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The main conclusion that follows from our research is that “signals” method can be useful as 
the basis for an early warning system of currency crises in CEEC. Despite the fact that many 
of the countries from the sample did not experience a severe currency crisis resulting in a 
major devaluation or change in the exchange rate regime in the 1990-ies, the “signals” 
approach helped us to identify indicators that anticipate episodes of turbulence in the region. 
We should stress that the results from the “signals” approach are consistent with previous 
empirical works on this subject as many of signaling indicators, which prove to be useful 
under this approach, receive support from the theoretical and empirical literature presented in 
the Section 2. We tried to identify warning indicators for currency disturbances in CEEC 
taking into account a broad variety of economic and financial indicators. The selection of the 
indicators is based on the assumption that currency crises are usually preceded by symptoms 
coming from all of sectors of the economy.  
 
The measure of currency disturbances calculated in Section 3 allows us to detect the dates of 
mild pressures on foreign exchange markets, or even real crises episodes in the region. The 
majority of countries were able to avoid a full-blown crisis contrary to those, which were 
forced to abandon the existing exchange rate regime. For example, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, and Romania have switched to another exchange rate regime after being exposed to 
strong speculative attacks on their domestic currencies. This research proposes a specific early 
warning system for each country, recording the signals issued by indicators when they exceed 
the critical value.  
 
The indicator that has proved to be trustworthy in anticipating disturbances in Bulgaria is 
reserve adequacy ratio (with a probability of crisis conditional on the signal from the indicator 
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amounting to 70 percent and NTS ratio 0.18). Similarly reserve adequacy ratio, is also 
Romania’s most trustworthy indicator with NTS 0,09 and 100 percent of good signals emitted 
in the pre-crisis period.  In the Czech Republic, the best-ranked indicator was the real money 
market interest rate (P crisis/signal is 54 percent) with NTS ratio of 0.26. Real effective and 
real bilateral exchange rates are Croatia’s best indicators that issue early warning signals with 
NTS 0.22 and 0.32 respectively. Interestingly, we may confirm some previous works 
(Bruggemann and Linne, 1999) that found that the imports in Hungary have played as the best 
warning indicator with NTS ratio of 0.37.  Latvia has had a problem with money growth, as 
indicated by real reserve money, as well as real money supply with NTS 0.23 and 0.33 
respectively.  Contrary to Hungary, Lithuania has experienced periods of substantial decrease 
in exports, which perform as the best indicator with NTS ratio of 0.15. Poland’s best 
indicator, bank’s deposits, suggests that there may be elements typical of a “twin” crisis. 
Banking problems seem to be the trigger for currency disturbances in Slovakia with central 
bank claims on deposit banks being the leading indicator with NTS of 0.14. Reserve money 
has shown to be the most credible signal in Slovenia with NTS of 0.35.  
 
In the final section we show that it is possible to explain the common symptoms of currency 
disturbances in emerging markets of Central and Eastern Europe. Specific conditions in those 
countries, such as structural reforms, domestic and external financial liberalization process, 
foreign indebtedness and domestic sectors’ imbalances in the observed period add to the 
likelihood of currency disturbances. We cannot neglect the signals of spillover effects within 
the region as in 1998, when the currency crisis in Asian countries and Russia affected a 
number of emerging countries, thereby drying out capital inflows. The analysis of the sample 
suggests that many of the variables that proved to be reliable signals of currency disturbances 
are consistent with theoretical and empirical literature focusing on the causes of currency 
crises. Indicators that have proven to be particularly useful in anticipating crises include 
reserve money growth, reserve adequacy ratio, foreign liabilities of monetary institutions, real 
money market interest rate, budget deficit, real effective exchange rate and domestic credits 
growth. Even though we have not examined banking crises, the appearance of strong signals 
of banking sector disturbances could partially explain the currency crisis episodes in the 
region.  
 
Nevertheless, while the “signals “approach may be an useful analytical tool in anticipating 
crises, such a system is also subject to limitations. The problem may arise from a short list of 
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referent dates, the shortness of time series and the bi-variate character of the approach. The 
last can be overcome by constructing and evaluation the performance of composite indices for 
each country consisting of the best signaling indicators. As in any such system, it is 
impossible to incorporate a number of unexpected political events and institutional issues that 
may be relevant for each country for assessing the warning system. Still, the evidence 
presented in this paper and other previous works has provided some support for using the 
“signals” approach to explain or even anticipate the rising vulnerability of the foreign 
exchange market.  
 
The accession process to the EU for all of the observed countries obliges them to pursue 
structural reforms and further liberalization of their capital accounts. These types of analyses 
may allow policymakers enough maneuvering space to avoid or at least minimize negative 
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a. IMF International Finance Statistics 
b. The Vienna Institute for International Economics Studies Database 
c. Web sites of central banks  
 
The indicators are expressed as annual growth rates, with the exception of exchange rates, interest 
rates, and budget deficit as a share of output. 
 
 
1. The real effective exchange rate – is a weighted average of the index of bilateral exchange rates of 
the national currency against a basket of currencies corrected for the relevant relative price indices (the 
ratio of price indices in partner countries and domestic prices).  
2. The real bilateral exchange rate NC/EUR – is nominal bilateral exchange rate NC/EUR 
multiplied by HICP inflation in Euro-zone and divided by national CPI.  
3. International reserves, total, USD. 
4. Net usable international reserves (NUIR) in USD, NUIR = foreign assets – foreign liabilities. 
5/6.  NUIR/broad money (M4) – broad money comprises money (M1), savings and time deposits, 
foreign currency deposits as well as bonds and money market instruments. Additionally, this series 
form another indicator as annual growth rates.  
7/8. CB foreign assets/broad money (M4). 
9. M4 multiplier - M4/M0, M0 is base (reserve) money.  
10. M1 multiplier – (M1/M0). 
11. Money supply (M1), real.  
12/13. Reserve money (M0), nominal and real.  
14/15/16/17. Domestic credit/output – total banks credits to domestic sectors, quarterly GDP data 
were interpolated considering the monthly change in the CPI deflator, industrial production and 
seasonally adjusted production. 
18. Domestic credits, nominal.   
19. Bank deposits 1 – sum of demand, time and foreign currency deposits. 
20.  Bank deposits 2 - calculated as broad money minus currency in circulation. 
21. Ratio of banks’ reserves to total bank assets. 
22. Ratio of banks’claims on public sector to total assets. 
23. Monetary institutions’ claims on public sector (net). 
24. CB claims on deposit banks.  
25. Foreign liabilities of monetary institutions.  
26. Export growth. 
27. Import growth.   
28. Trade balance.  
29/30/31/32.  Budget deficit/output, quarterly GDP data were interpolated considering the monthly 
change in the CPI deflator, industrial production and seasonally adjusted production. 
33. Real money market interest rate.  
34. Real lending minus real deposit interest rates. 
35. Current account balance in USD, quarterly. 
36. Capital inflow in USD, quarterly. 















noise-to-signal ratio % good signals % false signals P crisis/signal P crisis/signal – P crisis
B/(B+D)/A/(A+C) A/(A+C) B/(B+D) A/(A+B) A/(A+B) –A+C/(A+B+C+D)
1 2 3 5 6
1 NUIR/M4 0,18 59 11 70 40
2 Foreign assets /M4 0,18 78 14 70 40
3 International reserves, USD 0,28 58 16 50 28
4 NUIR / M4,yoy 0,29 53 15 50 28
5 Reserve money, M0, real 0,3 62 18 40 24
6 Real lending-real deposit rate 0,33 52 17 50 25
7 Net usable reserves (NUIR),nc 0,35 47 17 45 23
8 Budget deficit/output 0,37 67 25 36 19
9 Budget deficit/output (CPI) 0,37 67 25 36 19
10 Budget deficit/output (ind) 0,37 67 25 36 19
11 Budget deficit/output (ind,ma) 0,37 67 25 36 19
12 Foreign liabilities of monetary institutions 0,48 42 20 40 16
13 Imports, USD 0,51 42 21 28 12
14 DMBs' reserves/total assets 0,54 37 20 37 13
15 Real effective exchange rate 0,55 45 25 39 13
16 Domestic credits/output (ind,ma) 0,59 37 22 37 11
17 DMBs' claims on public sector/total assets 0,59 37 22 35 11
18 CB claims on DMB's 0,59 37 22 35 11
19 Trade balance 0,59 50 30 25 9
20 Domestic credit, nominal 0,61 37 22 35 10
21 Exports, USD 0,64 33 21 24 8
22 Domestic credits / output (CPI) 0,72 32 23 32 7
23 Domestic credits/ otuput (ind) 0,72 32 23 32 7
24 Foreign assets /M4, yoy 0,74 32 23 30 6
25 Claims on gen.government, net, monet. instit. 0,74 32 23 30 6
26 Capital inflows 0,8 30 24 30 4
27 Current acount balance 0,8 30 24 30 4
28 M4/M0 0,89 26 23 26 2
29 Real bilateral exchange rate, nc/euro 0,96 26 25 28 1
30 Domestic credits / output 0,97 26 25 25 1
INDICATORS
noise-to-signal ratio % good signals % false signals P crisis/signal P crisis/signal – P crisis
B/(B+D)/A/(A+C) A/(A+C) B/(B+D) A/(A+B) A/(A+B) –A+C/(A+B+C+D)
1 2 3 5 6
1 Real money market interest rate 0,26 58 15 54 31
2 NUIR / M4,yoy 0,32 67 22 53 26
3 CB claims on DMB's 0,33 50 17 50 25
4 Net usable reserves (NUIR),nc 0,44 42 18 45 18
5 Exports, USD 0,48 42 20 42 16
6 Real effective exchange rate 0,52 42 22 28 11
7 Reserve money, M0, nominal 0,55 50 28 40 13
8 International reserves, USD 0,56 38 21 39 13
9 Foreign liabilities of monetary institutions 0,56 50 28 38 13
10 DMBs' deposits 1 0,56 50 28 38 13
11 DMBs' deposits 2 0,56 38 21 38 13
12 Foreign assets /M4, yoy 0,64 46 29 37 10
13 Reserve money, M0, real 0,64 46 29 37 10
14 Claims on gen.government, net, monet. instit. 0,67 46 31 33 8
15 Domestic credits / output 0,70 33 23 33 7
16 NUIR/M4 0,72 42 30 33 7
17 Foreign assets /M4 0,72 42 30 33 7
18 Domestic credits/output (ind,ma) 0,80 29 23 30 4
19 Domestic credits / output (CPI) 0,84 29 25 29 3
20 Capital outflows 0,87 25 22 29 3
21 Budget deficit/output (CPI) 0,96 21 20 24 1
22 Real bilateral exchange rate, nc/euro 0,98 25 24 22 0















noise-to-signal ratio % good signals % false signals P crisis/signal P crisis/signal – P crisis
B/(B+D)/A/(A+C) A/(A+C) B/(B+D) A/(A+B) A/(A+B) –A+C/(A+B+C+D)
1 2 3 5 6
1 Real effective exchange rate 0,22 43 9 77 35
2 Foreign assets /M4 0,26 50 13 60 32
3 Domestic credits / output 0,3 46 14 65 30
4 Real bilateral exchange rate, nc/euro 0,32 63 20 60 28
5 DMBs' reserves/total assets 0,35 46 16 58 26
6 CB claims on DMB's 0,35 46 16 58 26
7 NUIR/M4 0,41 58 24 48 20
8 M1/M0 0,43 42 18 53 21
9 Domestic credit, nominal 0,43 42 18 53 21
10 Capital inflows 0,55 50 27 40 13
11 Current acount balance 0,56 50 28 44 13
12 Foreign liabilities of monetary institutions 0,66 33 22 42 10
13 Claims on gen.government, net, monet. instit. 0,69 42 29 43 8
14 M4/M0 0,78 29 23 41 6
15 Budget deficit/output 0,79 29 23 44 6
16 DMBs' claims on public sector/total assets 0,82 29 24 37 5
17 Real money market interest rate 0,85 38 32 39 4
18 Trade balance 0,86 38 32 33 3
INDICATORS
noise-to-signal ratio % good signals % false signals P crisis/signal P crisis/signal – P crisis
B/(B+D)/A/(A+C) A/(A+C) B/(B+D) A/(A+B) A/(A+B) –A+C/(A+B+C+D)
1 2 3 5 6
1 Imports, USD 0,37 67 25 37 19
2 NUIR/M4 0,46 42 19 37 16
3 M4/M0 0,57 50 29 33 11
4 M1/M0 0,58 50 29 32 10
5 Real effective exchange rate 0,64 46 29 24 7
6 Claims on gen.government, net, monet. instit. 0,65 46 30 32 8
7 Domestic credit, nominal 0,65 46 30 32 8
8 Reserve money, M0, nominal 0,8 29 23 24 4
9 Domestic credits / output 0,84 38 32 27 3
10 Money supply, M1, real 0,93 27 25 25 1
11 Real lending-real deposit rate 0,98 33 33 17 0
12 Reserve money, M0, real 0,98 33 33 22 0
INDICATORS
noise-to-signal ratio % good signals % false signals P crisis/signal P crisis/signal – P crisis
B/(B+D)/A/(A+C) A/(A+C) B/(B+D) A/(A+B) A/(A+B) –A+C/(A+B+C+D)
1 2 3 5 6
1 Reserve money, M0, real 0,23 58 13 61 35
2 Money supply, M1, real 0,33 67 22 52 26
3 Domestic credits / output 0,41 58 24 48 20
4 Domestic credits / output (CPI) 0,41 54 22 48 20
5 Foreign assets /M4, yoy 0,49 54 26 42 16
6 M4/M0 0,61 46 28 37 11
7 Reserve money, M0, nominal 0,62 33 21 36 10
8 Domestic credit, nominal 0,66 33 22 35 9
9 Claims on gen.government, net, monet. instit. 0,66 33 22 35 9
10 Imports, USD 0,72 42 30 40 8
11 NUIR / M4,yoy 0,74 42 31 32 6
12 Foreign liabilities of monetary institutions 0,78 42 32 31 5
13 Foreign assets /M4 0,81 29 24 27 4
14 Capital inflows 0,89 38 33 27 2






















noise-to-signal ratio % good signals % false signals P crisis/signal P crisis/signal – P crisis
B/(B+D)/A/(A+C) A/(A+C) B/(B+D) A/(A+B) A/(A+B) –A+C/(A+B+C+D)
1 2 3 5 6
1 Exports, USD 0,15 67 10 73 45
2 Budget deficit/output (CPI) 0,21 58 13 70 37
3 Budget deficit/output (ind,ma) 0,21 58 13 70 37
4 Domestic credits / output (CPI) 0,25 71 18 57 32
5 Budget deficit/output 0,25 50 13 67 34
6 Budget deficit/output (ind) 0,25 50 13 67 34
7 Money supply, M1, real 0,28 58 16 54 30
8 Domestic credits / output 0,28 54 15 54 29
9 Domestic credits/output (ind,ma) 0,32 50 16 52 26
10 Domestic credits/ otuput (ind) 0,34 67 23 50 24
11 Reserve money, M0, real 0,35 50 18 48 24
12 Capital outflows 0,56 38 21 38 13
13 Claims on gen.government, net, monet. instit. 0,58 38 22 36 12
14 CB claims on DMB's 0,58 38 22 36 12
15 Reserve money, M0, nominal 0,69 3 23 32 8
16 Real lending-real deposit rate 0,69 33 23 29 7
17 Real bilateral exchange rate, nc/euro 0,7 33 23 29 7
18 Real money market interest rate 0,74 42 31 30 6
19 Domestic credit, nominal 0,75 42 31 30 6
20 DMBs' claims on public sector/total assets 0,75 42 31 30 6
21 Trade balance 0,83 38 31 32 4
22 Capital inflows 0,89 38 33 27 2
23 International reserves, USD 0,99 33 33 24 0
INDICATORS
noise-to-signal ratio % good signals % false signals P crisis/signal P crisis/signal – P crisis
B/(B+D)/A/(A+C) A/(A+C) B/(B+D) A/(A+B) A/(A+B) –A+C/(A+B+C+D)
1 2 3 5 6
1 DMBs' deposits 1 0,26 83 22 45 27
2 Real money market interest rate 0,27 63 17 45 27
3 DMBs' deposits 2 0,39 67 26 36 18
4 Reserve money, M0, real 0,4 50 20 35 17
5 Real lending-real deposit rate 0,4 67 27 34 17
6 Net usable reserves (NUIR),nc 0,51 42 21 30 12
7 Foreign liabilities of monetary institutions 0,53 42 22 29 11
8 Budget deficit/output (CPI) 0,61 31 19 40 11
9 Budget deficit/output (ind) 0,61 31 19 40 11
10 Budget deficit/output (ind,ma) 0,61 31 19 40 11
11 Budget deficit/output 0,71 31 22 36 7
12 Trade balance 0,76 42 31 23 5
13 Real bilateral exchange rate, nc/euro 0,81 29 24 26 4















noise-to-signal ratio % good signals % false signals P crisis/signal P crisis/signal – P crisis
B/(B+D)/A/(A+C) A/(A+C) B/(B+D) A/(A+B) A/(A+B) –A+C/(A+B+C+D)
1 2 3 5 6
1 NUIR/M4 0,09 100 9 63 50
2 Foreign assets /M4 0,23 100 23 40 27
3 Foreign liabilities of monetary institutions 0,24 75 18 39 26
4 Money supply, M1, real 0,31 83 26 33 20
5 DMBs' claims on public sector/total assets 0,31 83 26 33 20
6 Claims on gen.government, net, monet. instit. 0,35 58 20 32 18
7 M1/M0 0,36 58 21 30 17
8 Net usable reserves (NUIR),nc 0,42 50 21 27 14
9 NUIR / M4,yoy 0,42 50 21 27 14
10 Capital outflows 0,46 50 23 20 10
11 Foreign assets /M4, yoy 0,47 42 19 25 12
12 DMBs' reserves/total assets 0,53 42 22 23 10
13 CB claims on DMB's 0,53 42 22 23 10
14 International reserves, USD 0,64 50 32 13 4
15 Real bilateral exchange rate, nc/euro 0,73 33 24 73 61
16 M4/M0 0,75 42 31 17 4
17 Real effective exchange rate 0,76 42 32 11 3
18 Exports, USD 0,98 58 57 17 1
INDICATORS
noise-to-signal ratio % good signals % false signals P crisis/signal P crisis/signal – P crisis
B/(B+D)/A/(A+C) A/(A+C) B/(B+D) A/(A+B) A/(A+B) –A+C/(A+B+C+D)
1 2 3 5 6
1 CB claims on DMB's 0,14 100 14 50 37
2 DMBs' deposits 1 0,24 75 18 38 25
3 DMBs' reserves/total assets 0,29 67 19 33 20
4 DMBs' deposits 2 0,29 67 19 33 20
5 Foreign assets /M4, yoy 0,35 58 20 29 16
6 Foreign liabilities of monetary institutions 0,55 42 23 21 8
7 Imports, USD 0,55 42 23 21 8
8 Real effective exchange rate 0,56 42 23 14 6
9 International reserves, USD 0,62 50 31 19 6
10 Budget deficit/output (ind) 0,98 25 24 13 0
11 Budget deficit/output (ind,ma) 0,98 25 24 13 0
INDICATORS
noise-to-signal ratio % good signals % false signals P crisis/signal P crisis/signal – P crisis
B/(B+D)/A/(A+C) A/(A+C) B/(B+D) A/(A+B) A/(A+B) –A+C/(A+B+C+D)
1 2 3 5 6
1 Reserve money, M0, nominal 0,35 50 17 46 23
2 Real bilateral exchange rate, nc/euro 0,36 46 16 44 22
3 Imports, USD 0,41 46 19 44 20
4 Reserve money, M0, real 0,57 50 29 32 10
5 Capital inflows 0,57 38 21 33 11
6 Capital outflows 0,57 38 21 33 11
7 Money supply, M1, real 0,69 33 23 29 7
8 Real money market interest rate 0,75 42 31 27 5
9 Real lending-real deposit rate 0,76 42 32 25 5
10 Budget deficit/output (CPI) 0,78 29 23 27 5
11 Budget deficit/output (ind,ma) 0,78 29 23 27 5
12 Budget deficit/output 0,82 29 24 26 4
INDICATORS
